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Wilbanks: Labor Law and Feminist Jurisprudence

COMMENT

UNION POWER, SOUL POWER:1
INTERSECTIONS OF RACE,
GENDER AND LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

During the past thirty years, American intellectuals have
become increasingly disillusioned with the labor union as an
instrument of social change. 2 This disillusionment occurs

1. "Union power" and "soul power" were commonly coupled as the call words
designating Local 1199's strategy to join union and community support. UPHEAVAL
IN THE QUIET ZONE 129 (Fink & Greenberg eds., 1989) [hereinafter "UPHEAVAL"].
See also, PHILIP FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER 395 (1974)
[hereinafter "FONER"]; Raskin, A Union with 'Soul', N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 22, 1970, § 6
(Magazine), at 24 [hereinafter "Raskin"]. Local 1199 is the union representing
health care workers in Charleston, South Carolina and the focus of this article.
See infra Sections II-IV for further discussion of Local 1199.
2. UPHEAVAL, supra note 1, at 128. See, CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNION'S
SURVIVE? (NYU Press 1993) (stating that union influence in the private sector will
be negligible by the year 2000 unless organized labor commits more resources to
organizing new members, especially those members who are women or minorities)
[hereinafter "Craver"]; Unions Must Change Course, Professor Says, 142 Labor Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 417 (Apr. 12, 1993) (interviewing Professor Charles B. Craver of
George Washington University). See also, Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and
Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819 (arguing that debate rages in scholarly publications about the future relevance of labor unions) [hereinafter "CRAIN I"]; Paul
Weiler, Hard Times For Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1015, 1029-32 (1991) (stating that empirical evidence corroborates his contention that employer reprisals have been a significant reason for the private sector
decline in union representation); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the
Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631, 661-62 (1985)
(concluding that government intervention is unavoidable if unions continue to decline); Julius Getman, Is Labor Law Doing Its Job?, 15 STETSON L. REV. 93, 93-94
(1985) (reporting widespread disillusionment with labor law in the academic community); Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda
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against the backdrop of a sharp decline in the unionized sector
of the labor force and, more recently, mounting industrial defeats and political setbacks. 3 Despite their current status, labor unions continue to represent a viable vehicle for social
reform. 4 Alternatively, a social movement itself may present a
union with the opportunity to draw from a larger pool of support. 5
An especially useful example of how a pressing labor issue

and a national social movement can meet in such a way as to
further the ends of both causes is presented in the Charleston
hospital workers' strike of 1969. 6 The Charleston strike was
one of the liveliest and stormiest labor disputes in American
history primarily because the strike was able to intersect its
labor dispute with the major social movements of the era. 7
This intersection added to the power and effectiveness of the

for Legal Reform, 38 CATCH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that current economic, political, and legal climate are hostile to labor law).
3. See, Crain, supra note 2, at 1819 and n.2. See also, Union Membership
Unchanged at 16.1 Percent in 1991, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at B-1 (Feb.
11, 1992) (reporting that over thepast 37 years, the percentage of the work force
belonging to unions has dropped from 34.7% (in 1954) to 16.1% (in 1991»; The
bulk of the decrease in the percentage of the total work force who are union members has occurred during the last 16 years: Union membership as a percentage of
employed workers was 28.9% in 1975, compared with 16.1 in 1991. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 408 (1987); Marvin J.
Centron, Into the Twentieth Century, THE FuTuRIST, July-Aug. 1988, at 29, 35.
Union membership in the private work force is even lower: In 1995, nine
out of ten private sector workers were not unionized, and unions are struggling to
simply save their membership rosters after a decade of declining membership.
Asra Q. Nomani, Shaken Solidarity; Struggling to Survive, Unions Battle Unions
To Build Memberships, WAIL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995, at 1. In 1991, only 11.9% of
employees in the private sector were union members, a significant drop from the
25% who were members in 1973. Union Membership Unchanged at 16.1 Percent in
1991, supra; Union Coverage of Private Workforce Predicted to Fall Below 5 Percent by 2000, 3 Lab. ReI. Wk (BNA), at 1185 (1989). The forecast for the next decade is even darker. For example, two labor economists have predicted that the
percentage of the private sector work force that is unionized may fall below five
percent by the year 2000. Id.
4. See infra Sections III and IV for further discussion.
5. See infra Sections III and IV for further discussion.
6. The experience of Local 1199 affords encouraging evidence that a racially
integrated approach within existing institutions can redistribute power and thus
begin to satisfy the yearning of those in the cellar of opportunity for self-direction
toward a place in the sun. Raskin, supra note 1, at 24.
7. Id. at 25, 38. See also infra Section II for specific details of the Charleston
strike.
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strike, allowing it to gather an extraordinary momentum that
flowed from both the hospital workers of Charleston and from
the larger civil rights movement of the time. 8
Because momentum is essential to any successful strike,9
a law that undercuts momentum will necessarily undercut a
union's ability to effect meaningful change. Nevertheless, Congress enacted just such a law when it passed the 1974 Health
Care Institution Amendments (hereinafter "Amendments") to
the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA"), thereby creating a 10-day strike notice provision for health care
workers. 10
The Amendments created rules ostensibly aimed at protecting both the unique status of the patient and the arrangement of "continuity of patient care."ll The amended rules,
however, place a tremendous burden on health care unions by
deflating their important, initial momentum without allowing
for reasoned exceptions. 12 The importance of this initial momentum becomes even clearer when viewed through the eyes
of a union consisting mainly of women and people of color. 13 It
is these traditionally excluded groups14 who need the addi8. The union and the social reform movement effectively came together in
Charleston for three reasons. First, the union actively tapped into the changing
social climate and consciousness of the labor force itself. Second, the union created
a connection to a larger dynamic of public sector collective bargaining. Third, the
conflict quickly spilled out beyond the workplace into a community-wide political
issue. UPHEAVAL, supra note 1, at 128.
9. See infra Section IV for further discussion of the importance of momentum
in successful strikes.
10. Section 8(g) of the NLRA provides:
A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work at any health care
institution shall, not less than ten days prior to such
action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service of that intention . . .
The notice shall state the date and time that such action
will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended
by the written agreement of both parties.
N.L.R.A. § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1995).
11. S. REP. No. 766, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Lawrence F. Feheley,
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Health Care Institutions, 36
OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 250 (1975) [hereinafter "Feheley"J.
12. See infra Section IV for discussion of the burden the amended rules place
on health care unions.
13. See infra Section II.
14. Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist Deconstruction,
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tional strength which a social movement can give them, and
the added strength which the law currently denies them. 15
This Comment will cover three main topics. First, this
Comment will tell the story of the Charleston strike and the
individual women involved. 16 Second, this Comment will examine, through the eyes of those individuals, the unique ways
in which race and gender come together to create unique circumstances that deserve legal consideration. 17 For both of
these sections, I use the women's own voices to illustrate and
~einforce substantive points. 18 Third, this comment will describe the 10-day strike notice provision, examining how it
would have affected the Charleston workers had it been enacted in 1969 during the time of the strike. 19 Finally, in light of
those observations concerning race and gender, I will propose
an exception to the 10-day strike notice provision. 20 This proposed exception to the lO-day strike notice provision is particularly important to women because they are more likely to work
as a health care providers and therefore are more likely to be
affected by health care legislation. 21

33 B.C. L. Rev. 481, 482 (1992) [hereinafter "Crain II"].
15. See infra Sections III and IV.
16. See infra Section II.
17. See infra Section III.
18. Recent feminist and legal scholarship has begun to recognize the important
role personal narrative plays in understanding how people behave and how the
law could better respond to personal and cultural differences. See, Margaret E.
Montoya, Mascara, Trenzas, Y Grenas: Un / Masking the Self While Un / Braiding
Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 185 (1994) [hereinafter
"Montoya"J. See also, Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1988) (finding that "in order to energize legal theory, we need to subvert it with
narratives and stories, accounts of the particular, the different, and the hitherto
silenced.") [hereinafter "Angela Harris"J; Carol Gilligan, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT, 147 (1982) (pointing out that
an insistence on more facts and on a more contextualized understanding of dilemmas helps the actor to appreciate the social contingencies of legal problems) [hereinafter "Gilligan"J.
19. See infra Section IV for further discussion of what effect the strike notice
provision would have had on the Charleston strikers.
20. See infra Section IV.C. for a more detailed analysis of this proposal.
21. The fact that women have been the classic caretakers spills over into the
health care system-more than 75 percent of health care workers are women, and
more than 85 percent of hospital health workers are women. Kathy Maeglin,
Women's Double Burden Now Norm; Home, Job Can Cause Overload, THE CAPITAL
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1995, § Savvy at 2F. See, Janelle M. Rettler, Women's Work:
Finding New Meaning Through a Feminist Concept of Unionization, 22 GoLDEN
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II. THE STORY OF CHARLESTON AND LOCAL 1199
On March 20, 1969, approximately 500 22 nonprofessional
employees (e.g., nurses' aides and orderlies) and members of
Local 1199B National Organizing Committee of Hospital &
Nursing Home Employees23 began picketing the Medical College of South Carolina in Charleston to protest the discharge of
twelve employees who had been engaged in organizational
activities on behalf of the Union and their fellow nonprofessional employees. 24 The picketing was also an attempt to inform the public about the abominable wages 25 and working
conditions26 that existed at the Hospital, as well as to gain
recognition for the Union as the bargaining representative of
the employees. 27 Their protest was the inevitable result of

GATE U. L. REV. 751, n. 4 (1992) (stating generally that women are more likely to
hold positions as nurses and hospital aides). [hereinafter ''Rettler''J. Others report
that female sex segregated jobs include nursing aides of which 88% of the workers
are female. In 1983, women accounted for 96% of registered nurses. Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretation of Sex Segregation
in the Workplace in Title VII cases raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARv. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (1990) [hereinafter "Schultz"J. See also, Rettler, supra
note 21, at 751 n. 1 and 752.
22. There are conflicting statistics regarding the actual number of strikers
involved. Raskin reports the number as 500. Raskin, supra note 1, at 38. Eugene
G. Eisner and Philip Sipser report the number as 400. Eugene G. Eisner & I.
Philip Sipser, The Charleston Hospital Dispute: Organizing Public Employees and
the Right to Strike, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 254 (1970) [hereinafter "Eisner &
Sipser"J.
23. This local union was chartered by Local 1199, Drug and Hospital Union,
(RWDSU), AFL-CIO, which represented more than 30,000 hospital workers in the
metropolitan New York area. Late in 1969, Local 1199B became one of the charter
locals of a new nationwide division of hospital and nursing home employees.
Eisner & Sipser, supra note 22, at 254.
24. Id. The major dispute concerned hospital employees, almost all black, and
almost all female, employed by the Medical College. Although it was not widely
reported at the time, some 100 nonprofessional employees, again almost all black
and female, employed by the Charleston County Hospital, were also involved in
the controversy. Although many of the problems encountered during the protracted
strike were the same in both hospitals, that portion of this article dealing with
the legal problems in the dispute in Charleston will refer to those at the State
Medical College [hereinafter "the Hospital"J. Id.
25. The women were paid $1.30 an hour or less. Eisner & Sipser, supra note
22, at 255.
26. The women repeatedly complained about sexual harassment, but their concerns were dismissed and no grievance procedures existed by which they could
make formal complaints. FONER, supra note 1, at 394.
27. Id.
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years of frustration and discrimination; all 500 strikers were
black and all but twelve of them were women. 28
As early as 1968, black workers in Charleston's hospitals,
with the help of some groups in the black community, began to
hold meetings to organize. 29 In September of 1968, the workers attempted to talk with Dr. William McCord, president of
the medical college and director of its hospital, about union
recognition or, if that was not possible, the establishment of a
grievance committee. 3o They were denied an opportunity to
meet. 31 Finally, in March of 1969, after many more requests,
Dr. McCord agreed to meet with a delegation representing
Local 1199B. 32
The meeting was never held. 33 When the five hospital
workers selected for the delegation arrived at the director's
office, they were informed that he had called off the meeting. 34 When they returned to their duties, they learned that
they and seven union members had been fired for allegedly
leaving their posts without permission. 35
Not less than forty-eight hours after the dismissal, the 500
women walked out. 36 Within the week, ninety workers at the
Charleston County Hospital walked out in sympathy.37

A. A

SOUTHERN SETI'ING

The cultural and economic fire into which the strike soon
spread was the result of a well documented history of racial
mistreatment. The State of South Carolina was not generally
known for its progressive nature. 38 Moreover, the state had a

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Raskin, supra note 1, at 40.
FONER, supra note 1, at 388.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FONER, supra note 1, at 388.
Id.
[d. See also, Raskin, supra note 1, at 25.
FONER, supra note 1, at 388. See also, Eisner & Sipser, supra note 22.
Eisner & Sipser, supra note 22, at 255.
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reputation for antiunionism because it had induced low wages
and given tax abatements to Northern industry.39
Charleston in particular was noted for its racial discrimination and lack of civil rights. 40 The city, where older black
males still doffed their caps to white passersby, seemed to fall
well within Robert Colses's characterization of the entire state
in 1968: "No southern state can match South Carolina's ability
to resist the claims of Black people without becoming the object of national scorn.,,41 Furthermore, Charleston had essentially escaped trade unionism and, consequently, the workers
were steadily growing restless. 42
B.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

The strikers had the added loyalty of the black community, a loyalty based in part upon their need to support one another given the racist environment of the South. Thousands of
Charleston's black citizens turned out regularly for marches
along routes lined with police, state troopers and National
Guardsmen with fixed bayonets. 43 In fact, the black community had assisted the hospital workers from the beginning, aiding
in the initial organization of 1199B. 44 Later, the black community supported the strike by actively participating in the boycotts45 and marches. 46 When Coretta King addressed one rally, 7500 people, nearly thirty percent of Charleston's black
population, packed a local church to hear her support the strikers.47
Finally, the hospital workers were fueled by the positive
example of the recent successful Memphis sanitation strike in
which a predominately black union had been supported by

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
ER WE
46.
47.

[d.
FONER, supra note 1, at 386.
UPHEAVAL, supra note 1, at 131.
FONER, supra note 1, at 286.
Eisner & Sipser, supra note 22, at 255.
FONER, supra note 1, at 388.
See supra note 1, at 143. See also, WILLIAM HAMILTON HARRIS, THE HARDRUN 176 (1982) [hereinafter "HARRIS"]; FONER, supra note 1, at 389, 391.
[d.
FONER, supra note 1, at 389.
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both the black community4S and the larger national civil
rights movement. 49
C.

THE SUPPORT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

As the Memphis strike had shown, the civil rights movement had the power to strengthen strikes. 50 The Charleston
strike acknowledged this power and strengthened its own community by involving the major figures of the civil rights movement. 51 Coretta King, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s newly widowed wife, often addressed the strikers' rallies 52 in which she
stated "[i]f my husband were alive today he would be right
here with you tonight."s3 Eventually, Mrs. King was named
Honorary Chairman of National Organizing Committee of
Hospital and Nursing Home Employees. 54

48. Id. at 380. In Memphis, sanitation workers went on strike against their
employer, the City of Memphis. The strikers were predominately black men protesting unsafe working conditions, racial discrimination and wages which earned
them only $53-$60 a week. In retaliation, the City issued injunctions, called in the
National Guard, and the Mayor publicly denounced the strikers. Id.
However, the black community came to the strikers' aid. Negro ministers
helped raise funds for food and clothing for strikers' families; an estimated total of
$100,000 was contributed by the black community alone. Leaders of the black
community formed committees to visit landlords, utility companies, loan companies,
and retail stores. They succeeded in pressuring those organizations, by threatening
a boycott, into promising that no evictions would take place for the duration of
the strike and that a moratorium would be declared on the collection of all debts
from the strikers. When the strike ended on April 16, 1968, sixty-five days after it
had begun, the workers had won all of their key issues and returned to work on
April 17. Id.
49. Id. The strikers won the support of the Memphis NAACP; the Unity
League, another Negro organization; most of the city's black ministers; and the
AFL-CIO Labor Council. A Committee of Concerned Citizens, uniting the black
community (with some white liberals) behind the strikers, and a Citizens' Committee to Aid the Public Works Employees, composed of labor unions, black and
white, was established. The Reverend Harold Middlebrooks, a black minister, stated that, ''The strike has united us as nothing has before . . . I've lived here all
my life and never seen anything like it. A Movement has begun." Id.
50. See supra notes 48 and 49 for a more detailed discussion of the Memphis
strike.
51. For example, Coretta King was actively involved in the strike. UPHEAVAL,
supra note 1, at 128, 133, 138, 140, 143-44, 148, 154.
52. Id.
53. See, UPHEAVAL, supra note 1, at 144. See also, FONER, supra note 1, at
391.

54. Id. at 395.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/7

8

Wilbanks: Labor Law and Feminist Jurisprudence

1996]

LABOR LAW AND FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

445

Furthermore, the national heads of nine civil-rights organizations and five elected black officials issued a joint statement in support of the strike. 55 They stated that the struggle
in Charleston was "more than a fight for union rights. It is
part of the larger fight in our nation against discrimination
and exploitation-against all forms of degradation that results
from poverty and human misery."56
D. RESOLUTION

When the dust settled, the strike had lasted a total of 100
turbulent days,57 bringing the city of Charleston to its knees
as a result of almost daily marches, rallies and boycotting of
schools and downtown merchants. 58 The strike also resulted
in citywide curfews,59 injunctions,60 and the arrests and jail-

55. [d. at 390.
56. [d. at 390; DAILY WORLD, Apr. 22, 1969.

57. FONER, supra note 1, at 394.
58. Eisner & Sipser, supra note 22, at 255.
59. HARRIS, supra note 45, at 176. On May 1, amid both planned confrontation
and random violence, Governor McNair imposed martial law and a dusk-to-dawn
curfew in Charleston. Alice Cabaniss, a contemporary writer, later captured the
feel of the disturbed city in a poem called "Strike and Curfew":
Through the narrow, empty streets,
trees and bees and birdcall line
the concrete unexpectedly
since fear in black sat down
along the curb to mutter insurrection.
Bivouacked in the suburbs,
mothers mend what they might
yesterday have thrown away,
await the lifting of the curfew,
to replenish larders, resume laughter.
Merchants lounge in doorways
cursing ease, grouping angrily,
hawk-like where their mice have fled
to cooler caves, patrolling windows,
counting guardsmen going by.
That friendly seeth, familiar faces,
melts to vacuum. Denmark Vesey smiles
with pleasure from another century;
black shadows on the empty streets
undo the handshakes of my friends.
Jack Bass, "Strike at Charleston," New South, Summer 1969, at 35-44. The poem
is quoted on p. 44.
60. HARRIS supra note 45, at 176. An injunction handed down by the segregationist Judge Singletary limited picketing to "ten people . . . at a time-twenty
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ing of over 1000 participants. 61 Mass arrests took place when
the governor called in the National Guard,62 a common tactic
used by employers preying on the public's perception of the
violent nature of strikes. 63 The Charleston press applauded
the governor for these arrests, stating that he had taken "the
only action the black strikers would understand."64 Ashley
Cooper, a columnist of the Charleston News and Courier,
wrote: "It seems-at least to me-that the only way the illegal
uprising can be stopped is by force. That may have the ring of
fascism-which I hate-but honestly, what other conclusion is
there?,,65
The entire situation was finally resolved without resort to
the courts. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(hereinafter "HEW") conducted an investigation of the hospital,
placing it at risk to lose over twelve million dollars in federal
grants. 66 HEW found thirty-seven civil rights violations and
formally recommended the rehiring of the twelve union workers whose dismissal had touched off the strike. 67 As might be
expected, the financial pressure implied by the HEW findings
immediately triggered new moves toward a settlement. 68 Furthermore, businessmen, complaining that the marches, boycotts and curfews were ruining both their trade and the tourist
business in general, pressed the state government into raising

yards apart," and no closer than eight blocks from the hospital. The black workers
defied the injunction and conducted mass picketing around the hospital site. They
were promptly arrested. FONER, supra note I, at 388.
61. By the end of the first week of the strike, 100 strikers were in jail.
FONER, supra note I, at 388. By the end of the strike, over 1000 arrests had
taken place. Raskin, supra note I, at 38.
62. UPHEAVAL, supra note I, at 154 (photograph); Raskin, supra note I, at 38.
Governor McNair also sent 600 state troopers in addition to the National Guardsmen. FONER, supra note I, at 389.
63. Interview with Maria Ontiveros, Professor of Law, Golden Gate University,
in San Francisco, CA, specializing in employment and labor law (Apr. 2, 1995).
See generally, CASES ON LABOR LAw, UNIVERSITY CASE BOOK SERIES, (11th ed.
1990). In fact, female workers are more likely than their male counterparts to participate in peaceful strikes. Crain I, supra note 2, at 1883 (arguing that much of
female lnilitance is difficult for male unionists to recognize because it does not
take the conventional form of bursts of violence).
64. FONER, supra note I, at 389.
65. [d. CHARLESTON NEWS AND COURIER, Apr. 26, 1969.
66. FONER, supra note I, at 392.
67. UPHEAVAL, supra note I, at 152.
68. UPHEAVAL, supra note I, at 152-53.
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the state minimum wage by thirty cents an hours to $1.60. 69
In the end, the fight of the women strikers and many
others resulted in a $1.60 pay floor. 70 They also won wage
increases from 30 to 70 cents an hour.71 Additionally, they
won the establishment of a credit union and grievance procedures. 72 Finally, all workers were reinstated. 73 Although Local 1199B did not win union recognition,74 almost every other
similarly situated union after the Charleston strike who fought
for union recognition did win recognition. 75 In other cities,
white unions began to recruit black members because of the
reputation gained in the Charleston strike. 76 More importantly, however, the strike had changed the lives of the women
who led the strike. 77 The women had a newly found solidarity
forged in the common experience of oppression across race and
gender. 78

69. FONER, supra note 1, at 392. Since March 31, 1991, the federally determined minimum wage rate is $4.25 an hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1995).
70. [d. at 394. See also, Eisner & Sipser, supra note 22, at 255.
71. FONER, supra note 1, at 394. See also, Eisner & Sipser, supra note 22, at
255.
72. [d.
73. [d.
74. [d.

75. A similar realization on the part of many Baltimore hospital workers
helped bring 7,500 nonprofessional employees there under union contract after the
Charleston triumph. Raskin, supra note 1, at 38.
76. FONER, supra note 1, at 396.
77. See infra Section III for further discussion.
78. Marion Crain, a legal scholar, suggests that modem labor law must build
on such a form of solidarity based on race, gender and class. Crain II, supra note
17, at 535. Gillian Lester also suggests that successful campaigns share the
overarching strategy of promoting personal empowerment and women's gaining
control of their lives. Gillian Lester, Toward the Feminization of Collective Bargaining Law, 36 McGill L.J. 1181, 1201 (1991) [hereinafter "Lester"].
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III. RACE, GENDER AND LAW: INTERSECTIONS79
Given the unique makeup of the Charleston strikers, it is
important to examine what characteristics made the women
strikers and their union so effective. Their intersections are
important for two reasons. 80 First, the workers' intersections
provide support for the recent trend in legal scholarship which
recognizes the importance of cultural connections among workers. 81 Second, viewing intersections points out the practical
way in which common bonds work together to create a greater
strength. 82
A.

THEORETICAL GROUNDING IN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

Feminist legal theory draws from the experiences of women and from critical perspectives developed within other disciplines to offer powerful analyses of the relationship between
law and gender and to offer new understandings of the limits
of, and opportunities for, legal reform. 83 This theory, as a
body, represents one of today's most significant challenges to
contemporary law and legal institutions. 84 Finally, feminist
jurisprudence provides hope to working women whose experiences within the legal system have often been negative.

79. The author takes the tenn "intersections" from two articles which discuss
how race and gender often combine to create unique legal problems. The first is a
Kimberle Crenshaw article entitled, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory,
and Antiracist Politics," U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter "Crenshaw"]. The
other is an Elizabeth Iglesias article entitled, Structures of Subordination: Women
of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HARv. CIV. RTSCIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 395, 397 (1993) [hereinafter "Iglesias"].
80. Ernestine Bryant, one striker, proves the union's awareness of issues of
"intersections" when she said, "We deserve respect regardless of age, race or
creed." AMERICA'S WORKING WOMEN 360 (Baxandall et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter
"WORKING WOMEN"].
81. See, Crenshaw, supra note 82 and Iglesias, supra note 84. See also,
Montoya, supra note 21; Maria Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 23 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817 (1993) [hereinafter
"Ontiveros"].
82. See infra notes 115-43 and accompanying text for examples of how common
bonds contribute to group strength.
83. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAw AND GENDER 1 (K. Bartlett &
R. Kennedy eds., 1990) (back cover) [hereinafter "Feminist Legal Theory"].
84. Id.
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Much of feminist jurisprudence focuses on challenging
legal systems based solely on precedent, arguing that such a
system ignores the experiences of marginalized groupS.85 Instead, feminist legal theory argues for a broad re-definition of
legal problems. 86 Feminist jurisprudence examines women's
workplace problems, defining them both as women's problems
and as legal problems. 87 If legal problems are not broadly defined, feminist jurisprudence argues, the law risks
marginalizing the real problems that women face daily.88
Also at the core of most feminist jurisprudence is the assumption that men and women do not start out on equal footing;89 women often need to pass through more barriers in
85. The American judicial system is based on precedent. Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N. CAR. L. REV. 367 (1988) ("Even a cursory reading of
[court decisions] reveals that reliance on precedent is one of the distinctive features of the American judicial system.").
The term "precedent" refers to a principle of law which has been actually
presented to a court of authority for consideration and determination and which
has, after due consideration, been declared to serve as a rule for future guidance
in the same or analogous case. Empire Square Realty Co. v. Chase Natl. Bank of
City of New York, 43 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473. However, matters which merely lurk in
the record and are not directly advanced or expressly decided are not precedents.
Kvos, Inc. V. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 279 (1936). See supra notes 100-7 for
a further discussion of feminist approaches to the concept of precedent.
86. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1988) (finding that the traditional masculine and conservative view of a "Rule of
Law" does not recognize many female values and concerns) [hereinafter "West"];
Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial
Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990) (observing that "women's problems" are devalued in the federal court system) [hereinafter "Resnik"].
87. See generally, Schultz, supra note 2l.
88_ West, supra note 86; Resnik, supra note 86.
89. Although beyond the scope of this article, some scholars have argued that
gender inequality is based in large part on biological and/or intrinsic differences
between men and women. See, WOMEN AND MEN: NEW PERSPECTNES ON GENDER
DIFFERENCES 23 (Malkah T. Notman & Carol C. Nadelson eds., 1991). See also,
West, supra note 92 (going as far as any feminist legal theorist in claiming that
women are a category with certain experiences that lead them to "be" different
from men).
For contrary views, compare Jana Singer, Symposium on Divorce and Feminist Legal Theory: Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the
Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2431 (1994) ("More modern
efficiency theorists-perhaps recognizing the divisiveness of these biological assumptions-generally disclaim reliance on intrinsic gender differences"); Leslie
Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality?, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 941, 948
(1989) ("Gender difference does not cause gender inequality; gender inequality is
gender difference translated into hierarchical power relations in which one gender
(male) is privileged."); SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, LAw AND EQUALITY: LENSES OF GEN-
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order to reach the same status that men may automatically
achieve. 90 Moreover, the race barrier creates an equally complicating barrier for many working women. 91
One feminist legal scholar, Kimberle Crenshaw, argues
that dominant conceptions of discrimination incorrectly condition us to think that disadvantage occurs along only a single
categorical axiS. 92 By this, Crenshaw means that most legal
theory assumes that discrimination occurs because of a
person's sex or race, but not that a special form of discrimination exists that is based on both sex and race. Crenshaw believes, however, that the intersection of disadvantages is greater than the sum of racism and sexism. 93
DER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY (Yale Univ. Press 1993)
(criticizing the 1980's theorists for reproducing the lenses of gender polarization
and biological Essentialism and for espousing the politically dangerous idea that
vast "natural" differences exist between men and women).
90. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence. Journal of Women in Culture and Society, U. CHI. J.
WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 635 (1983) [hereinafter "MacKinnon"].
91. Other factors such as homosexuality may further contribute to compounded
discrimination. When a homosexual seeking protection of the law is also a member
of a racial minority, the problems of stigmatization and prejudice are often enhanced and may even serve to negate free-standing allegations of racial discrimination. Katharine T. Bartlett, GENDER AND LAw: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY
454 (Little, Brown & Company eds., 1993). For example, in Williamson v. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.s. 1089 (1990), the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a race discrimination
claim by a gay black male on grounds that the harassment of which plaintiff
complained was based on his homosexuality, not his race. Although the opinion
provides too few facts for detailed analysis, the court appears to assume that the
plaintifl's complaint had to be one either of race discrimination or of discrimination based on the plaintiffs homosexuality. Such an assumption can blind a court
to the form of discrimination that arises because the person is both a member of
a minority racial group and a homosexual. [d.
92. Crenshaw, supra note 79.
93. Crenshaw, supra note 79, at 58. The recent O.J. Simpson trial is a recent
example of how race and gender can collide, often creating guilt and mixed loyalty. One newspaper reporter aptly described the problem faced by the jury:
Undeniably, there were assumptions about this jury. They
were most women. And there was a presumption that
they could be sympathetic to the female condition in
today's America ... At the same time, the O.J. Simpson
jury was mostly black, and subject to the split allegiance
of black women everywhere-loyal to their gender and yet
also loyal to black men.
Elizabeth Fernandez and Annie Nakao, Jury's black women: Caught in Conflict;
Did Race, Gender, Loyalties Collide?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1995, at Al and AIO
[hereinafter "Fernandez & Nakao").
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Similarly, Professor Maria Ontiveros argues that the elements of a sexual harassment case of women of color are different and more onerous than those in a purely sexual harassment case. 94 For although a supervisor might not discriminate
against black men or white women, he might nonetheless discriminate against black women. Treating these cases as sexual
harassment, Ontiveros maintains, "not only misstates the
dynamic, but also further disadvantages these women.,,95
Katharine T. Bartlett and Roseanne Kennedy take a similar approach to the intersection of race and gender. 96 Bartlett
and Kennedy describe the problems women face in the
workplace with their concept of a "top-down" structure whereby victims of discrimination must establish their claims according to categories that fail to recognize the relationships between race and sex. 97 Thus, when black women are treated in
ways different from either black men or white women, their
discrimination claims will not be recognized on the basis of
either race or sex. 98 Consequently, the danger of discrimination increases when race and gender combine. 99
As well as attacking conventional notions of discrimination, Bartlett and Kennedy target the strict notion of precedent.lOo Bartlett and Kennedy contend that since standards of

94. See Ontiveros, supra note 8l.
95. [d. The women of Charleston were disadvantaged on multiple levels. For
example, Mrs. Brown, one striker, noted the common female problem of dealing
with children who were often left alone because of her fight, and a husband who
complained at having to help at home. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 80, at 360.
96. Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 83.
97. Id. at 6.
98.Id.
99. Drucilla Ramey, executive director and general counsel of the San Francisco Bar Association voiced her own opinion of the problems created when race and
gender combine:
Women of color feel torn apart by loyalty issues. They
honestly don't know if they are discriminated against
because they're black, because they're women or both.
Because of this country's disgraceful history of racism and
what it has done to black men and black women, I think
that it is very, very difficult for black women to be put in
a position of having to choose between whether race
should predominate over gender.
Fernandez & Nakao, supra note 93, at AlO.
100. Precedent, or stare decisis, means that an adjudged case or decision of a
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what is rational only reflect the interests of those who currently hold power,101 the law's insistence on precedent has constrained feminist agendas to the extent to which it has insisted
upon arguments it deems rational and coherent. 102 Therefore,
new doctrines are often considered extreme, and the status quo
is preserved; this situation further perpetuates the exclusion of
marginalized groups. 103 Moreover, under a precedential system, even irrational and incoherent arguments must be accepted and followed. 104
Elizabeth Iglesias, another feminist legal scholar, agrees
that the precedential system is based upon a decidely masculine power structure. lOS Iglesias invokes the concept of "struccourt will furnish an example or authority for an identical or similar case afterwards arising. In this way, courts attempt to decide cases on the basis of principles established in prior cases. Neff v. George, 4 N.E.2d 388, 390-91 (Ill. 1936);
Horne v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505, 509-10 (Tex. 1940); State v. Mellenberger, 95
P.2d 709, 719-20 (Ore. 1939); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von Bank, 8 N.W.2d 599,
607 (N.Dak. 1943). See also, supra note 85.
101. Id. Belief in a socially constructed reality is not unique to feminist jurisprudence. See, PETER L. BERGER AND THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Doubleday 1966)
(The basic contentions of the argument are implicit in the title and subtitle, namely that reality is socially constructed and that the sociology of knowledge must
analyze the processes in which this occurs). It is from Marx that the sociology of
knowledge derives its root proposition-that man's consciousness is determined by
his social being. See generally, THE MARx-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed.
2d ed. 1978).
102. See Feminist Legal Theory supra note 83, at 3.
103. See Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 83. Although Kennedy and Bartlett
narrowly argue that stare decisis is only a problem when it takes no account of
women, this author contends that stare decisis creates the broader problem of
disregarding any marginalized group, female or otherwise.
104. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) ("Unless we wish anarchy to
prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those
courts may think it to be.") (emphasis added).
105. Iglesias, supra note 79. Similarly, Robin West maintains that the law is
currently based on "Masculine Jurisprudence." West, supra note 96. See also,
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw
34-36 (1987) (arguing that gender neutrality is simply the male standard); Martha
Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 47, 47-56
(Mar.lJune 1988) (arguing that assertions of neutrality hide from view the use of a
male norm for measuring claims of discrimination); Suzannah Sherry, Civil Virtue
and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV 543 (1986)
(arguing that a "feminine" jurisprudence exists distinct from conventional "masculine" jurisprudence). Among the critics of Sherry's position is Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim "A Different Voice?" 15 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 44-46 (1992) (arguing that "masculine" jurisprudence is apparent
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tural violence" to examine how legal interpretation constructs
institutional power, thereby creating a false reality based on a
distinctly male perspective. 106 Iglesias further argues that
women have a difficult time liberating themselves from these
relations of oppression, these socially constructed categories of
race and gender, because the current organization of institutional power is so well entrenched. 107
In addition to challenging conventional concepts of equality, scholars have begun to make constructive suggestions for
change. Katherine Bartlett suggests that one solution to compounded discrimination is to "ask the woman question.'1l08
This method is designed to expose how the substance of law
may silently and without justification submerge the perspectives of women and other excluded groupS.l09 Secondly, Bartlett suggests expanding traditional notions of legal relevance to
make legal decision making more sensitive to the features of a
case not already reflected in legal doctrine. l1o Bartlett's third
method, consciousness-raising, offers a means of testing the
validity of accepted legal principles through the lens of the
personal experience of those directly affected by those principIes. 111

among conservative female judges such as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who is
characterized by a focus on abstract and universal principles rather than civic
republicanism which is focused on responsibility and human interdependence).
106. Id.
107. Iglesias, supra note 79, at 397. Edrena Johnson, a striker who was jailed
for nine days, kept a diary during that time in which she wrote, "We want to be
recognized, not because of our race but because were are human beings. FONER,
supra note 1, at 389·90.
108. Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 83, at 371. Carol Gilligan similarly
points out that the more feminine approach to insisting on more facts and on a
more contextualized understanding of dilemmas would increase appreciation of the
social contingencies of problems. GILLIGAN, supra note 18.
109. Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 83, at 371.
110. Id.
111. Similarly, Patricia Cain emphasizes the importance of real life experiences
in creating a more equal legal system. Although Cain's main focus is the invisibility of lesbians in the law, her arguments have wider implications since Cain believes that current feminist legal theory is deficient and impoverished because it
has not paid sufficient attention to the real life experiences of women who do not
speak the "dominant discourse." She urges that feminist law teaching ought to
include "listening to difference" and "making connections"; she urges the same for
feminist legal scholarship. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-1990) [hereinafter "Cain"J.
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Each of these affirmative suggestions and methods is designed to force people to recognize problems and begin to ask
the right questions. Tacitly accepting the values and beliefs of
a given political or legal agenda, feminist jurisprudence argues,112 distorts reality.113 Once the definition of legal problems is expanded and the correct questions are asked, the current legal system can begin to step toward true equality, a
main goal of all feminist legal scholarship.114
B.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF INTERSECTIONS

Although the law, through feminist jurisprudence, has
taken some steps toward change,115 the steps have been

112. In asking and answering questions, feminist legal theorists point out that
every practice has its theoretical assumptions, whether or not they are explicitly
acknowledged. Only those who agree with the implicit assumptions, values, and
beliefs of a given political or legal agenda can afford to disregard theory, since
failing to identify and challenge these assumptions makes them appear all the
more natural and inevitable. BARTLETT, supra note 83, at 4.
113. Catharine MacKinnon argues that a male reality defines most aspects of
society. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAw 34-36 (1987). Although Drucilla Cornell would not agree to a purely
gender-based, constructed reality, she does recognize the validity of social constructions:
[Tjhe "reality" of woman cannot be separated from the fictions in life and in theory for which she is embodied.
This does not deny the reality of a constructed world, but
only reminds us that reality is constructed through the
metaphors in which it is given body. Therefore, there is
no rigidly designated reality, even that of gender hierarchy.
DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION
AND THE LAw 129 (1991).
114. John Stuart Mill, the leading spokesman for nineteenth-century liberalism,
describes the subordination of women and explains his feminist goals:
[Tjhe principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes-the legal subordination of
one sex to the other-is wrong in itself, and now one of
the chief hindrances to human improvement; . . . it ought
to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting
no power of privilege on the one side, nor disability on
the other.
JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, THREE ESSAYS BY JOHN STUART
MILL 427-28 (World's Classics 1912).
115. For example, some courts have recognized discrimination claims of black
females as a distinct, protected subgroup. See, Prince v. Commissioner, U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 713 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987). The Hicks court stated that:
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small ones, and women are far from achieving true equality.
This failure of legal reform to secure lasting, fundamental
change in hierarchical gender relationships demonstrates the
inseparability of legal theory and practice. 116 This section will
show that the strikers' "intersections" of race and gender created a greater sense of community and solidarity, enabling them
to speak with a larger and stronger voice.117 This section· will
show how these intersections work in practice, developing how
the female strikers' "disadvantages" actually aided them in
their organization. 118
As discussed earlier in Section II, Local 1199B was disad-

vantaged not merely twofold through race and gender, but
threefold with the addition of class. 119 First, the union consisted of people of color. 120 Second, the workers were mainly
women. 121 Third, the workers were extremely poor.122 For
this reason, Local 1199B was not a "normal" union. 123 In

Hicks introduced evidence that her supervisor, Gleason,
had made serious racial slurs against blacks. Such evidence should be considered on remand to determine
whether there was a pervasive discriminatory atmosphere,
combining the racial and sexual harassment evidence . . .
[Elvidence on racial treatmenf should be considered for
this combined purpose here with the sexual harassment
evidence.
Id. at 1416-17.
116. Bartlett, supra note 83, at 4.
117. See infra notes 119-43 and accompanying text for further discussion.
118. See infra notes 119-43 and accompanying text for further discussion.
119. See infra Section II for further discussion.
120. FONER, supra note 1, at 390. Raskin, supra note 1, at 25.
121. Id.
122. All of the strikers suffered from the fact that they were poor; most workers lived on $38 per week. UPHEAVAL, supra note 1, at 145. Also, the workers had
not attained high education levels. Dr. William McCord, the president of the hospital, remarked to a Business Week reporter: "1 am not about to turn over the administration of a 5-million dollar institution to people who never had a grammar
school education." FONER, supra note 1, at 389.
123. Local 1199B was not a normal union in part because their leaders and
workers were not white males. William B. Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The
Impact Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46, 47 (1969).
Blacks are excluded from most leadership positions in both craft and industrial
unions and have a disproportionately small representation at the staff level. Id.
See also, Steelworkers Debate Black Representation 91 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 16
(1968); Owens, UAW Blacks Seek Power, DETROIT FREE PRESS, September 30, 1968
at 3; N.Y. TIMES, February 27, 1967, at 16, col. 1; Raskin, supra note 1, at 40;
Lester, supra note 66, at 1206.
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Charleston, all of the original 500 strikers were black and all
but twelve of them were women. 124 Moreover, the women
held the jobs of nurses and nurse aides,125 jobs commonly referred to as "women's work.,,126 Gender became an especially
difficult problem for the workers because it was combined with
race which increased the likelihood of discrimination. 127
Yet despite their "disadvantages," the women were ultimately successful because of their commitment to their group,
the union. Miss Virgie Lee Whack's comments reiterated the
positive union rhetoric of "soul power" which she said had
"opened her eyes to a new strength."128 "I pray I never fall
into the same old routine but that I be as new born.,,129 This
positive aspect of intersections is suggested in Gillian Lester's
observation that successful campaigns share the overarching
strategy of promoting personal empowerment and women's
gaining control of their lives. 130 The newly found sense of
community enabled the women find the strength to open their
eyes to see how to effectuate change.
Marion Crain suggests that modern labor law must build

124. Raskin, supra note 1, at 40.
125. Eisner & Sipser, supra note 22, at 254.
126. Blumrosen, Wage discrimination, Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979). The concept of "women's
work" has a long historical tradition dating back to the beginning of the industrial
age when women factory workers held jobs that were specifically identified as
"women's jobs." The concept of "women's work" in the industrial age dates back to
the New England textile mills which had segregated jobs for the young women
who lived and worked at the mill. Rettler, supra note 21, at 751, n. 4.
127. Some courts have recognized that these groups face unique problems. See,
Prince, 713 F. Supp. at 984. The court in Prince stated:
Prince's claim of continuing discrimination does not fail
merely because there is evidence that the persons who
were hired in her place are members of one or two, but
not all three, protected groups (i.e., blacks, females, and
persons over 40 years of age) of which she was a member. Thus, it cannot be said that the hiring of one or
more employees from a protected group whose members
complain of disparate treatment absolves the employer of
liability for continuing discrimination against a member of
that group who was not hired.
Id.
128. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 80, at 362.
129. Id.
130. Lester, supra note 78, at 1201.
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on just such a form of solidarity based on race and gender. 13l
This solidarity did postively affect the Charleston strikers
since the women worked in combination with the community
and participated in boycotts and marches. Much of what the
strikers later related further proved that community had been
a significant factor in the striker's success. Mary Ann Moultrie,
the 27 year old president of Local 1199B,132 acted as a bridge
between the women, the black community and the civil rights
leaders. 133 In fact, Coretta King compared her to Harriet
Tubman, Sojourner Truth, Rosa Parks and Fannie Lou
Hamer. 134
Moultrie took pride in the fact that the strikers were fighting an entire power structure. 13S And that power structure
was not one to be taken lightly since it was the same structure
that civil rights leaders were actively fighting. In fact, the
Charleston strike had reached from the government run
hospital136 to Senator Strom Thurmond 137 and, ultimately,
even as far as the federal cabinet officers and members of the
131. Crain II, supra note 14, at 535. Mrs. Bessie Polite, one striker, is proof of
such solidarity. She noted how much strength the union had given her: "We needed something that would help support us ... we could go to our union." WORKING
WOMEN, supra note 85, at 359. She talked of how the women had "walked and
talked and sang and everything. [d. But then again, she noted, qwe were women-we didn't have any weapons." [d. See also, Lester, supra note 83, at 1198,
standing for the proposition that the moral framework of collective bargaining is
based on masculine social sterotypes of combat, access to "weapons" and the struggle of clashing powers.
132. Moultrie's simple and poignant goal was to allow her people to enjoy what
others have always been given. Moultrie told one reporter:
In the hospital they have white workers doing the same
work as blacks. You know, they might have a white
nurse's aid and a black nurse's aid yet the white aide
earns more money than the black. I want unioin recognition. I want to see that my people· are able to enjoy
something better than what they have been enjoying.
WORKING WOMEN, supra note 80, at 360.
133. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 80, at 360. UPHEAVAL, supra note 1, at 136.
134. See, UPHEAVAL, supra note 1, at 145. See also, FONER, supra note 1, at
390.
135. [d.
136. [d.
137. [d. Senator Strom Thurmond reportedly prevailed upon HEW secretary
Robert Finch to postpone his threatened fund cutoff to the hospital "pending a
personal investigation" after he returned from a planned vacation in the Bahamas.
This federal about-face was evidence of a larger conflict within the Nixon administration over civil rights enforcement. UPHEAVAL, supra note 1, at 153.
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White House Staff. l38 Nevertheless, through strength as a
group, the women forced a deaf hospital administration and a
disinterested legal community to listen and acknowledge them.
As the strikers proved, their commitment and pride had
strengthened them, despite their opponents' strength and size.
Alma Harden, a hospital aide and co-chairman of the 1199B
chapter,139 saw many benefits from the strike; it had let her
meet "a lot of people of importance. I've seen interesting places.,,140 She enjoyed the sense of community and she prided
herself that "Charleston would never be the same.,,141 But although the women did enact changes, they could not have
made those changes without the strength they gained from
each other and the community. They were able to successfully
strike only because their momentum lifted them beyond the
barriers placed before them.
And in this way, their "disadvantages," borne of a history
of abuse, converged at a unique moment in time to become
invaluable to their organization of a successful strike. 142 It
was a time that Mrs. Brown called "the hardest and most important period of my life."I43 From this shared outsider status
which enhanced their collective identity, their traditionally
excluded group gained a strength and a voice. If this community spirit had been destroyed, their efforts might not have
been successful. For this reason, the law should not prevent
similar workers from building such a strength based upon
similar support and momentum.

138. HARRIS, supra note 45, at 176.
139. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 80, at 363.
140. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 80, at 362.
141. UPHEAVAL, supra note 1, at 145. See also, WORKING WOMEN supra note 85,
at 363.
142. The experience of Local 1199 affords encouraging evidence that a racially
integrated approach within existing institutions can redistribute power and thus
begin to satisfy the yearnings of those in the cellar of opportunity for self-direction
toward a place in the sun. Raskin, supra note 1, at 24.
143. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 80, at 361.
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NOTICE

Strike steward Claire Brown had declared in her speech "I
am Somebody": "If I didn't learn but one thing it was that if
you are ready and willing to fight for yourself, other folks will
be ready and willing to fight for yoU."l44 She was right, of
course, but too often, the outcome of a political fight just as
surely depends upon timing and location. 145 Given timing's
importance, the law needs to look more closely at the troubling
problem that the current strike notice provision creates for
striking health care workers.
Currently, the Health Care Amendments provide that that
health care workers must give ten days notice of any intention
to strike. 146 Despite the drafters' good intentions ,147 the
rules, as amended, place a tremendous burden on health care
unions by deflating their important, initial momentum without
allowing for reasoned exceptions. l48 The importance of this
initial momentum becomes especially apparent when viewed
through the eyes of a union consisting mainly of women or
people of color. 149 These traditionally excluded groups150
need additional help in organizing successful unions and
strikes. This is a strength which currently only a social momentum can give them,151 and it is a need that the law
should recognize.

144. UPHEAVAL, supra note I, at 158.
145. Id. For the general proposition, see Maryellen Fullerton, Hijacking Trials
Overseas: The Need for an Article III Court, 28 WM & MARy L. REV. 1, 12 (1986).
146. N.L.R.A. § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1995). See infra note 153 for text of
Section 8(g).
147. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text for further discussion.
148. See infra notes 152-98 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
burden the amended rules place on health care unions.
149. See supra Section II for further discussion.
150. Schultz, supra note 21 (finding that "Working-class women have shared the
experience of being marginalized at work, but being unable to opt out.").
151. See infra Sections III and IV for further discussion.
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LAw

In 1974, the NLRA was amended to give the National
Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB") jurisdiction over
public health care facilities. 152 Section 8(g) of the NLRA, added by the Amendments, requires that a union which intends to
engage "in any strike, picketing, or concerted refusal to work
at any health care institution" must notify the institution and
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (hereinafter
"FMCS") at least ten days prior to instituting the
picketline. 153
The stated reason for this rule is the unique role that a
health care institution plays154 and a concern about the welfare of patients whose very life could be affected by a major
disruption in services. 155 The strike notice provision also
gives the Board an opportunity, if charges are filed after the
notice is received, to determine the legality of the strike or
picketing before it has a perhaps avoidable and unjustified detrimental effect on the health care institution. 156
However, these stated reasons for the strike notice provision are unfair in both theory and practice. First, such a strike
notice requirement is unfair in theory because applies only to
health care workers, workers who are predominately women.
The federal labor codes bind no other industry with similar

152. Ira M. Shepard, Health Care Institution Labor Law: Case Law Develop·
ments, 1974·78, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1978) [hereinafter "Shepard"l.
153. Section 8(g) provides:
A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work at any health care
institution shall, not less than ten days prior to such
action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service of that intention . . .
The notice shall state the date and time that such action
will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended
by the written agreement of both parties.
N.L.R.A. § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1995).
154. S. REP. NO. 766, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See Feheley, supra note 11,
at 236 for further support.
155. S. REP. NO. 766, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See Feheley, supra note 11,
at 248 for further support. See also, Shepard supra note 152, at 2.
156. S. REP. No. 766, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See Shepard supra note
152, at 2 for further support.
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strike notice provisions. 157 Although private agreements between employers and employees may provide for contractually
based strike notification,158 the federal government imposes
statutorily mandated conditions only on workers in the health
care field.
Secondly, the health care industry's strike notice provision
is unfair in practice because statutory exceptions are routinely
denied these workers, even when the law provides for an exception.159 Currently, the law allows only one exception to the
ten day notice provision. l60 When there has been a "serious"
or "flagrant" unfair labor practice, the union's failure to give
advance notice of picketing or strike activity will be over100ked. I61 However, legislative history indicates that the notice requirement will be excused only in "very limited situations," where an employer's unfair labor practice is so aggravated that a no-strike clause will be rendered unenforceable or
ineffectual. 162
In practice, however, this narrow exception for unfair labor
practices itself has rarely been found applicable, even though it
is commonly regarded as a valid exception. One recent court
even went so far as to state that:
[W]e are somewhat hesitant to give this legislative history effect, because it not so much guides

157. States also have the right, under the police power, to regulate or prohibit
strikes or lockouts in the enterprises or fields of endeavor directly affecting public
health, safety, or welfare. Fairview Hospital Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Service and
Hosp. and Inst'l Emp. Union Local No. 113, 64 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 1954). Such
regulation could apply not only to strikes affecting hospital care, but also to
strikes that effect the flow of heat, light, power, sanitation, transportation, communication, or water. State v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Federation of N.J. 66 A.2d 616
(N.J. 1949). However, the fact remains that no such steps have been taken except
with regard to the health care field in a federal context.
158. Abadie v. Bayou Steel Corp., 645 So. 2d 779, 781 (La 1994); Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp. v. Local 856, IntI. Union, 52 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 1995); United
Paperworkers Intl Union v. International Paper Co., 920 F.2d at 855 (11th Cir.
1991); In re Keane, 161 N.E. 2d 17 (NY 1959); Lavely v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 60 A.2d 352 (Pa. 1948).
159. See supra notes 160-77 for a further discussion of exceptions to the 10-day
strike notice provision.
160. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
161. Id.
162. Feheley, supra note 11, at 253.
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interpretation. . . but rather creates a significant exception. We do not find it so clear, as the
drafters of the Senate report did, that the exception should, or was meant to, apply in the section B(g) context. 163
The fact that this court consciously disregarded express legislative intent in order to deny health care workers an accepted
exception shows that the "recognized" exception has not been
truly recognized by courtS. I64
Furthermore, this exception is never applied to striking for
reasons other than unfair labor practices; in situations such as
sympathy picketing, no exceptions are given. 16S For example,
District 1199 v. National Union of Hospital Employees held
that if nurses at hospital A are striking and the nurses at
hospital B wish to sympathy picket, the workers at hospital B
must give new notice to hospital A, even though hospital A is
completely aware of the ongoing strike and the new notice
would not change the effect on continuing services. 166 The

163. NLRB v. Mental Health Council, 897 F.2d 1238 at 1247-48 (2nd Cir.,
1990). That court stated that:
Even if unfair labor practices could excuse compliance
with statutory requirements for advance notice prior to
health care employees strikes, and unfair labor practices
of employers were considered sufficiently flagrant to fall
within the scope of excuse document, advance notice of
strikes would not be excused.
Id.
164. Id. Other cases have followed this line of thought. West Lawrence Care
Center Inc. et ai, 1992 WL 259406 (NLRB) (Wash. D.C. 1991).
165. Feheley, supra note 11, at 252-3.
166. 222 N.L.R.B. 212 (1976). In District 1199, a local union gave notice of its
intention to strike upon the expiration of its collective-bargaining agreement. Fifteen days later, four members of District 1199 joined the picket line. The NLRB
had to address the issue of whether failing to give notice and subsequently engaging in sympathy picketing at a health care institution which already had notice of
an ongoing strike would violate Section 8(g). Although the Administrative Law
Judge concluded that no notice was required, the Board read Section 8(g) more
literally. The board stated:
In our opinion, the 8(g) notice requirement is clear and
absolute. First, it is mandatory . . . Second, it applies
regardless of the nature of the picketing involved . . .
Finally, Section 8(g) is devoid of any modifying language
respecting the character of the picketing, its objectives, or
the type of economic pressures generated. In the face of
this language, Respondent cannot rely upon the earlier
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dissent aptly criticized this holding on the ground that the
second union's actions did not change the character of the
strike. 167 As a result of District 1199, the "flagrant unfair labor practice exception" is of no use to the union except in
unique and rare circumstances. 16S Therefore, the exception
does not provide the predominately female health care workers
any true relief.
The Board has also ruled that even purely informational
picketing (picketing solely designed to inform the public that
the employer does not recognize the picketing union), where
the pickets expressly disavowed any intention to interfere with
access to the hospital, constituted picketing within the meaning of Section 8(g).169 Although the dissent characterized the
picketing as mere handbilling, the majority held that any picketing required the ten day notice, even where there was no
intent to create a work stoppage. 170 The potential disruption
inherent in any act of the picketing was sufficient, the majority
reasoned, to require a strict interpretation of section 8(g).171

notice given by another labor organization as a basis for
fulfilling its own statutory obligations . . . As examples,
this subjection would apply to recognition strikes, area
standard strikes, secondary strikes, jurisdictional strikes,
and the like.
Accordingly, the board found that the sympathy picketers of District 1199 had
violated Section 8(g). Id.
167. Id.
168. Feheley, supra note 11, at 254.
169. The District 1199, RWDSU court stated:
Local 1115's contention is that because the picketing was
of such a limited duration, the alleged violation should be
considererd de minimus. While the picketing did not go
on for more than 45 minutes, I cannot say that this constituted a de minimus action, especially as there was no
assurance given that there would not be any recurrences.
District 1199, 232 N.L.R.B. 443, 96 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1977).
170. Id.
171. Id. See also, General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution
Cases, First Report, Section I, 88 L.R.R. 8 (1975).
In another case, picketing by a construction union to
protest the presence of anon-union plumbing company at
a construction project on the premises of an operative
health care institution, although it was not directed at
any of the hospital's employees and caused no interruptions of deliveries to the hospital or work stoppages by
the hospital employees, was held to be within the 8(g)
proscription of picketing "at any health care institution"
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This decision, however, seems to have forgotten that the
public policy behind the notice rule is the unique nature of
hospitals where patients' lives take precedence. This decision
seems to have given no weight to the fact that there was no
threat of interruption in services. The senseless extension of
this rigid application has even led to one decision which held
that a walkout by a mere three workers for thirty minutes
required a ten day notice; in that case, there was no danger of
a disruption of patient care of any kind. 172
Traditionally, the board has stated that new exceptions
would be too complex to deal with,173 especially in cases
claiming an exception for no disruption of services. 174 One
court rejected the argument that exceptions to section 8(g)
were justified on the grounds that there was no disruption of
the health care institution, concluding that instituting such an
exception would mean that in many future strike cases, a complex fact-finding process would be necessary to determine
whether any disruption had occurred. 175 This literal
approach 176 is an uncompelling reason in light of the reality

without proper notice to the hospital. In the General
Counsel's view, the picketing represented a potential inducement to employees of both the hospital and its suppliers to engage in work stoppages, which could have a
disruptive and debilitating effect on effective patient care.
General Counsel Monthly Report on Health Care Institution Cases, First Report,
Section II, 88 L.R.R. 9 (1975). See supra note 13 for the text of 8(g).
172. West Lawrence Care Center Inc., 1992 WL 259406 (NLRB) Wash. D.C.
(1992).
173. One court rejected the argument that an exception to section 8(g) was
_ justified on the grounds that there was no disruption of the health care institution, concluding that instituting such an exception would mean that in many future strike cases a complex fact-finding process would be necessary to determine
whether any disruption had occurred. Shepard, supra note 161, at 10.
174. Plumbers, Local 360 (Lein·Steenberg), 219 N.L.R.B. 837 (1975). See
Shepard, supra note 161, at 9-10 for a further discussion.
175. Id. In Plumbers, a hospital hired a construction company to expand and
renovate its facilities. After a contract dispute, the construction company picketed
the hospital. Although the picketing was visible, hospital employees did not use
the picketed entrance, and hospital workers were not required to cross the picket
line in order to gain access. No hospital employees engaged in work stoppage or
other refusal to work, and there was no disruption of any of the services offered
by the hospital. Nevertheless, because the construction company did not give notice
of its intent to strike, the majority found that the
construction company had violated Section 8(g). Id.
176. Plumbers, 219 N.L.R.B. 212. See also, Feheley, supra note 11 at 249;
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of the need for the exception,177 especially when the union is
comprised of traditionally marginalized groups.
Although the board has never explicitly stated that its
intention is to break strike momentum, the strike notice provision is likely to produce that effect since it deflates the initial
momentum that successful strikes require. Given the inflexibility of the board, if the strikers are required to give a ten day
notice, regardless of the nature of the strike and regardless of
the number of workers involved, there is no chance for any
momentum gain because all striking would be prohibited. 178
B. OTHER THREATS TO STRIKE MOMENTUM

The Courts have also used injunctions when attempting to
break strike momentum. 179 When upholding injunctions, the
Supreme Court has explicitly stated its intent to curb momentum, even where picketing might be wholly peaceful. 180 In

Shepard, supra note 152, at 10.
177. In Plumbers, the minority disagreed with the finding that a construction
company had violated Section 8(g) when it picketed a hospital over a contract
dispute. The majority had found that the fact that no disruption of services had
occurred had no bearing on the analysis. However, the minority found two fundamental flaws in the majority's opinion:
First, while the majority suggests a "literal" reading of
Section 8(g) requires the result reached, we do not believe
a truly literal reading of Section 8(g) has been undertaken. Second, and more important, even if the majority is
correct in its literal reading of Section 8(g), such a reading does not compel the result reached if Section 8(g) was
not intended by Congress to reach that result and we do
agree with the majority's evaluation of that congressional
intent.
Plumbers, 219 N.L.R.B. at 23-24.
178. The workers, of course, would be allowed to help with union issues while
not on work time, but they would not be able to publically show their displease,
the main purpose of the strike.
179. The Charleston workers were not spared the injunction, either. The segregationist Judge Singletary limited picketing to ten people at a time, twenty yards
apart and no closer than eight blocks from the hospital. HARRIS, supra note 48, at
176. The injunction was used as a government tool in the Memphis strike as well.
See, supra note 51 for a further discussion of the use of injunctions in the Memphis strike.
180. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
In Milk Wagon, the Supreme Court upheld a generalized injunction against picketing where there had been past violence because "it could justifiably be concluded
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fact, in Local Union No. 10, United Assn. of Journeymen, the
Court stated that it intended to curb any momentum caused by
picketing because it was a potentially effective and practical
means of putting pressure on an employer. 18l
Justice Douglas' dissent, however, noted that "picketing is
a form of free speech-the workingman's method of giving
publicity to the facts of industrial life.,,182 He further added
that it is the very fact that speech incites action that makes its
protection so necessary.183 Justice Douglas wrote, "[f]or it is
the aim of most ideas to shape conduct."l84 Justice Douglas'
words are especially applicable to modern health care unions
whose predominately female workforce deserves the opportunity to build a voice through the momentum gained by striking.
Further threatening health care unions are business leaders who recently increased their opposition toward union organizational activities. 185 When the Supreme Court recently
sustained the authority of the Labor Board to promulgate rules
defining the bargaining units for health care institutions, 186
the American Hospital Association immediately pledged to

that the momentum of fear generated by past violence would survive even though
future picketing might be wholly peaceful. n Id. at 294 (emphasis added). See International Bhd. of Teamster, Local 695, A.F.L., et al. v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289
(1957) and Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 57 (1945) for further support of
this proposition.
181. 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Local 10, the court stated
that there was a reasonable basis in the evidence in that case for the state court's
finding that the picketing was for a purpose in conflict with a state statute, since
the immediate results of the picketing demonstrated its potential effectiveness as a
practical means of putting pressure on the general contractor to eliminate from
further participation all nonunion men or all subcontractors employing nonunion
men on the project. Local Union, 345 U.S. at 197-201.
182. Id (dissenting opinion).
183. Id.
184. Id. Similarly, Max Weber, an early twentieth century German sociologist
and economist wrote:
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images'
that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen,
determined the tracks along which action has been
pushed by the dynamic of interest.
MAx WEBER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WORLD RELIGIONS, 280 (H. Gerth &
C. Mills eds. 1946).
185. Craver, supra note 2 at 73.
186. Amercian Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, 111 S.Ct. 1539 (1991).
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fight union organizing efforts on all fronts. 1s7 In fact, one
prominent management attorney suggested that "employers
should use every waking moment to assess their vulnerability
to organizing and beginning the process of 'hardening the target."'l88 Given this antagonistic environment, modern labor
unions will have to devise novel methods of countering such
managment tactics, appealing to workers who might be contemplating collective action in order to retain their current
strength and build a foundation from which to groW. 1S9
It is somewhat ironic that the health care workers thought
that the 1974 Amendments were a breakthrough for hospital
workers' rights. The workers believed in the Amendments
because they specifically allowed public employees of health
care facilities to strike,190 a more recently granted right
which the Charleston strikers were never allowed. 191 In reality, however, if the Charleston workers had been subject to the
lO-day strike provision, it is all too possible that the mounting
momentum would have died since the Charleston nurses
walked out within forty-eight hours of the dismissaP92 and
the ninety workers who walked out in sympathy did so within
the week,193 well before the ten day notice would have allowed them to show their support.
It is possible that the board might have excused the failure to give notice under the exception by finding a "flagrant"
unfair labor practice. For although the workers had no statutory right to strike at that time,194 they nevertheless had the
constitutional right to organize. l9s However, in 1969, the hos187. 136 Lab. ReI. Rep. 497 (BNA) (Apr. 29, 1991).
188. 1d.
189. Craver, supra note 2, at 73.
190. N.L.R.A. 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1995).
191. South Carolina had no legislation which permitted or forbid collective bargaining by public employees. Therefore, at that time, the Charleston workers had
no statutory right to strike. Eisner and Sipser, supra note 17, at 261. In fact,
fewer than ten states at that time had laws which firmly guaranteed hospital
workers the rights to join unions, hold representation elections and bargain collectively, rights that most workers won over sixty years ago. Where there were no
such laws, hospital administrators had generally interpreted their absence as a
prohibition on dealing with unions. Raskin, supra note 1, at 38.
192. Raskin, supra note 1, at 25.
193. FONER, supra note 1, at 388.
194. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
195. The workers had the right to organize because the Constitution grants
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pital had no duty to recognize their organization. 196 Therefore, it is unlikely that the court would have found a "flagrant"
unfair labor practice. This is especially true given courts' extreme reluctance to use the exception as well as the fact that
the presiding court would have been located in the South, the
very locus and cause of so many of the workers' problems. 197
For these reasons, the ten day notice provision could have
killed what went on to become a symbol for both labor and
civil rights. 198

C. A PROPOSED EXCEPTION
As a response to both the unique characteristics of the

non-traditonal unions and the battles they face in organizing
simple protests, a new exception to the ten day notice provision
should be created. Health care workers should be allowed to
strike without a ten day notice unless the facility can affirmatively show that patient health care will be seriously undermined. Therefore, if only one or two people strike, or if temporary replacements are ready to step in, a strike would be permissible.
Courts or hospital administrators may counter that a
group of one or two protesters could easily grow to include
more strikers, thereby increasing the risk to patients. However, the hospital would still have notice of the strike and potential jeopardy to patient care, which is all that the notice provision intends. Furthermore, a hospital should not believe that it

them the freedom to associate. The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The freedom of association is. made applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution which provides that the State shall not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See
also, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech.").
196. [d.
197. See supra Section II for further discussion.
198. "Local 1199 is for American labor what 1776 is for American history: a
bright and morning star." UPHEAVAL, supra note 1 (book cover quoting Studs
Terkel).
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could ever have a guarantee of how many workers would strike
since under the current provisions, the workers are not required to indicate the number of workers who will strike when
they give notice to the hospital administration. Finally, if temporary replacements are available, patient care would not be
compromised. Given this, the health care strike notice provision acts more as a method for punishing protesting workers
rather than as a patient protector.
Furthermore, this burden shift would allow for most sympathy and informational 199 picketing because such picketing
would not normally disrupt patient care. If workers merely
intend to inform hospital patrons of problematic working conditions but do not intend to prevent hospital access or cease
work, the workers would not be prevented from exercising
their free speech rights under this proposal.
Such an exception is especially important to health care
workers who are predominantly female and largely black.
These excluded groups should not be denied the momentum
they can gain from drawing on community support. Consequently, the law must expand its notion of what constitutes a
legal problem,20o recognizing that these groups face unique
problems. 201 If the law refuses to recognize these important
factors, the law will have conceded to placing precedent above
reason. 202
Finally, to deny, even temporarily, a union one of its only
effective bargaining tools is to create a major power imbalance
between workers and employers. Such a power imbalance encourages greater industrial strife because it fuels resentment
between health care workers and their employers. 203 It is especially important that the NLRA not foster such an imbalance
since it was that very danger that the NLRA was created to

199. Purely infonnational picketing is picketing which lacks an object of recognition or organization. Local Jr. Exec. Bd. of Hotel Employees, 130 N.L.R.B. 570
(1961).
200. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion.
201. Id.
202. See supra note 85 and 100-7 and accompanying text.
203. Id. See also, CRAVER, supra note 2 at 26.
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prevent. 204 My proposed exception would allow a more just
result because it would encourage public support of these
working class issues while still keeping within the spirit of the
law.
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, an exception to the ten day strike notice
provision should be recognized. This is especially true of an
exception which is squarely in keeping with the policy behind
the rule. Such an exception is especially important when the
strikers are disadvantaged by race and gender. As feminist
jurisprudence has shown, these marginalized groups have little

204. Section 1 of the NLRA (originally known as the Wagner Act) was enacted
specifically to maintain power balances and to reduce industrial strife. Thus, Section 1 of the Wagner Act states:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or
actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce . . . Experience has probed that protection by law
of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce . . . by restoring equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States
to eliminate . . . obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
N.L.R.A. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1995). See also, David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law: Unions Membership Resignations
and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1277-78 (Dec.
1988) (stating that the NLRA was intended, among other thing, to facilitate some
shifting equilibrium in the relations between labor and employers).
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power in a traditional union. Accordingly, they need the added
strength gained from momentum, the very momentum that the
ten day strike notice provision robs them of.
Wendy L. Wilbanks·
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